





Emotive techniques and persuasive genres 
 
Emotion arousal played an integral role in Greek persuasion at least as far back as the 
Homeric epics, the earliest surviving Greek literary texts.  At the start of the Iliad, the priest 
Chryses seeks to persuade Agamemnon to give up his enslaved daughter Chryseïs.  He prays 
for Agamemnon’s and his army’s military success and safe return home, before offering a 
boundless ransom in exchange.  We might expect this wish and exchange offer to arouse 
emotions: goodwill or possibly friendship, gratitude, perhaps desire for the goods.  Homer 
does not mention these, but does say that while the other Achaians are won over to Chryses’ 
side – shouting their approval (ἐπευφήμησαν, 1.22) – Agamemnon is not pleased (οὐκ ... 
ἥνδανε, 1.24) and refuses.  Agamemnon utters a harsh threat against the priest, which in turn 
arouses his fear (ἔδεισεν, 1.33) and persuades him do as commanded, i.e. leave.  Chryses then 
calls on the god Apollo for support: he addresses him by a variety of flattering epithets, lists 
all the things he has done for Apollo, and asks that the god avenge his tears.  Whether or not 
the flattery and reminders arouse Apollo’s goodwill or gratitude (not stated), they certainly 
arouse his anger on Chryses’ behalf (χωόμενος κῆρ, 1.44; χωομένοιο, 1.46), and he punishes 
the Achaian army in revenge.1 
 Emotive argumentation had, therefore, long been part of persuasive strategies.  
However, our interest for this volume begins with the conscious reflection on and practice of 
emotive techniques of persuasion: i.e. the art, skill or science (technê) of rhetoric, and oratory 
that knowingly incorporates such techniques.  These were well established by the time 
Aristotle complained waspishly, in the introduction to his treatise The art of rhetoric (usually 
called simply Rhetoric),2 about rhetoricians’ tendency to over-focus on emotional arousal.  
Aristotle says that ‘Slander, pity, anger and such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with 
the facts, but are merely an appeal to the juror’ (Rh. 1.1, 1354a16-18: διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος 
καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν 
δικαστήν), and again that ‘one should not lead the juror into anger, envy or pity – it is like 
warping a carpenter’s rule’ (Rh. 1.1, 1354a24-26: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς 
ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ τις ᾧ μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον 
ποιήσειε στρεβλόν), and he complains that those who write treatises on rhetoric treat of little 
else (Rh. 1.1, 1354a11-16). 
Such rhetorical theorists were included among, or were direct intellectual descendants 
of, the sophists – itinerant teachers who wandered Greece from the mid-fifth century BCE 
taking on paying pupils, mainly the sons of the leisured classes.3  Many of the most famous 
sophists gravitated to Athens which, thanks to the revenues of its empire, had a large 
wealthy/leisured class in this period, who wanted their sons trained (inter alia) to address the 
Assembly.4  Sophists had a variety of interests, but rhetoric was frequently one of the subjects 
on their curricula. This interest is foregrounded in the most famous depiction of sophists in 
literature, in Aristophanes’ comedy Clouds (dated 423 BCE), in which Socrates is lampooned 
                                                 
1 Arist. Rh. 2.2, 1378a30-2 tells us that anger involves a desire for revenge.  Rubinstein (2004) shows how often 
calls for punishment or retribution (kolazein/timôreisthai) are coupled with calls for anger (orgê) in Attic 
courtroom oratory. 
2 Written probably in the third quarter of the fourth century BCE – see Kennedy (2007) 6. 
3 See Gagarin (2002) 9-36 on the sophists. 
4 On the sophists in Athens, see Wallace (1998). 
 as representative of the sophistic agenda: corrupting the young, not believing in the 
traditional gods, introducing new divinities,5 and teaching his pupils to wield morally wrong 
arguments so well as to overcome morally right ones.6 
One of the most important sophists – and most influential rhetoricians – was Gorgias.  
He features as one of Socrates’ interlocutors in Plato’s Gorgias, but in this dialogue his 
description of oratorical technique concentrates on the persuasive exposition of an argument, 
not arousing emotions.  Socrates, in contrast, stresses the affective aspect when he says that 
oratory consists of the knack of producing gratification and pleasure in the audience through 
flattery (Pl. Grg. 462c3-7: Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα … Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας; 
463a8-9: καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν).  Gorgias’s own Encomium of Helen, 
however, certainly recognises the importance of emotional persuasion, advising that: ‘Speech 
is a powerful lord that … can banish fear and remove grief and instill pleasure and enhance 
pity’ (8) and ‘The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as the 
application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel different fluids 
from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others end life, so also some speeches 
cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul 
with a kind of evil persuasion’ (14).7  It is perhaps this sort of approach that Aristotle 
complains about. 
By the late 420s, oratorical appeals to emotion were common enough to be satirized at 
length in Aristophanes’ comedy Wasps (dated 422).  Early in the play we get a report that 
Kleon – a demagogue, described by the hostile historiographer Thucydides as ‘very violent’ 
(3.36.6.4: βιαιότατος) – has enjoined jurors to turn up with three days’ worth of grievous 
anger, in order to punish offenders (Ar. Vesp. 243-4: ὀργὴν … πονηρὰν … ὡς κολωμένους 
ὧν ἠδίκησεν).  The enthusiastic juror Philokleon later describes how defendants ask for pity 
(οἴκτιρόν μ’, 556), then try everything they can to get off a charge: they bewail 
(ἀποκλάονται) their poverty and attribute their misfortunes to it; they quote myths, fables and 
jokes to make him laugh; they drag their children out front to bleat (βληχᾶται) in concert, 
while the defendant himself trembles (τρέμων) and entreats him as a god to approve his 
accounts, asking him to have pity on hearing his son, or be persuaded by his daughter – this, 
he says, makes him relax his anger a little (562-74).  And in the mock trial later in the play, 
Bdelykleon entreats Philokleon to have pity on (οἰκτίρατ’) the dog Labes, and brings in 
Labes’ puppies, whom he instructs to beg and entreat while whimpering (κνυζούμενα) and 
crying (δακρύετε) (975-8). 
While this could be dismissed as comic fantasy, the fact that it could be staged in 
front of an Athenian audience suggests it is unlikely they would find such behaviour 
unrecognisable.  Firmer evidence comes from [Lys.] 20 (For Polystratos), a lawcourt speech 
delivered not many years after this,8 in which the speaker says: ‘Nevertheless, gentlemen of 
the jury, we see that if somebody brings forward his children and weeps and laments (κλαίῃ 
καὶ ὀλοφύρηται), you take pity (ἐλεοῦντας) on the children … and pardon the father’s crimes 
on account of the children’ (20.34); he then begs: ‘we [not having children to bring forward, 
but an aged father] bring forward our father and ourselves, and beg (ἐξαιτούμεθα) … pity 
                                                 
5 The real life Socrates was in fact executed on just these charges, according to Plato (Ap. 24b).  See Hansen 
(1995) from the Athenian point of view. 
6 See Dover (1968) xxxii-lvii on the association of these charges with the sophist movement, and Aristophanes’ 
choice of Socrates to represent them.  In the play Unjust Argument (Adikos Logos), as his name implies, wins 
through mastery of eristic reasoning rather than emotional techniques. 
7 Tr. Kennedy (2007) 253-4. 
8 Todd (2000) 217 dates the speech to ‘probably 410 or possibly 409’. 
 (ἐλεήσατε) on our father, who is an old man (γέροντα ὄντα), and on us’ (20.35).9  The 
language and the behaviour are almost identical to that described in Wasps.10 
Other theatrical techniques were also available to orators.  In Aristophanes’ comedy 
Acharnians, Dikaiopolis seeks leave to dress up for his trial, so as to look totally wretched 
(Ar. Ach. 383-4: ἐάσατε ἐνσκευάσασθαί μ’ οἷον ἀθλιώτατον).  In both this play (711) and 
very frequently in Aristophanes’ Knights (274, 276, 285-7, 304, 311, 626, 1380), speakers 
use shouting, shrieking or a thunderous voice to terrify audiences.  Perhaps the most striking 
example of this in a real speech comes not from Classical Athens, but from an Assembly 
speech given in the Sicilian city of Enguion in the late third century BCE.  The speaker 
Nikias fakes possession by supernatural beings in order to freeze other citizens in fear long 
enough for him to flee the city safely (Plut. Marc. 20.5-6).11  Other emotions can be aroused 
in this way too: e.g. Aristotle describes how voice and other delivery techniques such as 
gesture, dress and dramatic actions can engender pity (Rh. 2.8, 1386a32-b5).12 
Despite his quibbles about the extent and manner in which other rhetoricians advised 
orators to manipulate emotions, Aristotle was perfectly happy for emotions to be aroused 
through proofs (pisteis).13  He argues: ‘Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken 
word there are three kinds.  The first kind depends on the personal character [êthos] of the 
speaker; the second on putting the listeners into a certain frame of mind [ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν 
διαθεῖναί πως]; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the argument [logos] of 
the speech itself’ (Rh. 1.2, 1356a1-4), then confirms re the second that ‘persuasion may come 
through the listeners, when the speech stirs the emotions [pathos]’ (Rh. 1.2, 1356a14-15: διὰ 
δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν).14  Having spent some time 
talking of other issues, he returns to emotions in a lengthy section of the treatise (Rh. 2.1-11), 
which he introduces as follows: 
 
The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, 
and that are also attended by pain or pleasure.  Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, 
with their opposites.  We [i.e. Aristotle] must arrange what we have to say about each 
of them under three heads.  Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must 
discover what the state of mind of angry people is, who the people are with whom 
they usually get angry, and on what grounds they get angry with them….  The same is 
true of the other emotions.15 
 
The following chapters are devoted to discussions of one emotion or a pair of ‘opposite’ 
(enantion) emotions: 2.2 and 2.3 respectively on anger (orgê) and calming down (praünsis); 
2.4 on friendship (philia) and hatred (misos); 2.5 on fear (phobos) and confidence (tharsos); 
2.6 on shame (aischunê) and shamelessness (anaischuntia); 2.7 on gratitude (charin echein) 
                                                 
9 Tr. Todd (2000) 226-7; the appeal for pity is repeated, slightly amplified, at 20.36.  Cf. also e.g. Dem. 21.99, 
[Dem.] 53.29 for further comments on this theme.  On appeals to pity, see particularly Johnstone (1999) 109-25, 
Bers (2009) 77-98; more generally across the ancient world, Naiden (2006). 
10 On emotional arguments paralleled in oratory and (satirized in) Old Comedy, see Carey (this volume). 
11 See Chaniotis (1997) 234-5 on this episode. 
12 On aspects of performance in Greek and Roman oratory, see Kremmydas, Powell and Rubinstein (2013).  
Hagen (this volume) explores the emotionally persuasive use of tears in Roman oratory and historiography. 
13 Dow (2007) is persuasive on resolving the ‘contradiction’ between Rh. 1.1’s criticism of emotional techniques 
and Rh. 1.2’s advocacy of emotional proofs; cf. Dow’s bibliography for further scholarship on this issue. 
14 Tr. Rhys Roberts (1984) 2155, slightly modified. 
15 Rh. 2.1, 1378a19-26, tr. Rhys Roberts (1984) 2195. See Leighton (1996) on the ways in which emotion can 
contribute to alteration of judgment.  Frede (1996) discusses how emotions are ‘accompanied’ by pain and 
pleasure. 
 and briefly ingratitude (acharistein);16 2.8 on pity (eleos); 2.9 on indignation (nemesis); 2.10 
on envy (phthonos); and 2.11 on emulation (zêlos) and scorn (kataphronêsis).17  The order of 
these emotions is somewhat indiscriminate.  With the exception that emotions relating to 
others’ bad or good fortune are grouped together at the end,18 there is no obvious reason for 
the order selected, and Aristotle does not advise directly on which emotions may be 
appropriate for different sorts of speech,19 or which will work well together.  A second 
surviving rhetorical treatise from the Classical period, probably by Anaximenes,20 also 
discusses emotion arguments – primarily in the chapters on deliberative and judicial oratory 
(respectively chs 34 and 36), in which he describes three friendly emotions (pity, goodwill 
and gratitude) and three hostile ones (anger, hatred and envy) as particularly important.21 
The second set of ancient source material of particular relevance to this volume is 
oratory, beginning with the group of speeches written and (mostly) performed in Athens in 
the period c. 420–322 BCE, known as the ‘Attic oratorical corpus’. This corpus contains 
approximately 105 judicial speeches (both prosecution and defence speeches, on matters of 
both public and private law, as well as adjudications),22 sixteen deliberative speeches 
(delivered to the Athenian Assembly), and a handful of display speeches (mostly funeral 
speeches, delivered by a leading politician to honour the war dead), as well as some letters,23 
political tracts, and rhetorical exercises.  Unlike the rhetorical treatises – the extent of whose 
relation to practical oratory is debatable – this corpus tells us how persuasion was actually 
‘done’ in this very fruitful literary period: these speeches, letters and tracts demonstrably use 
emotional techniques as part of their persuasion strategies.24  Such techniques are both overt, 
with emotions explicitly called for, or covert, with emotions aroused indirectly by the 
judicious use of words and phrases that act as psychological triggers.25 
Both these types of evidence – theoretical (rhetoric) and practical (oratory) – have 
their counterparts in later antiquity too.  Survivals from the Hellenistic eastern Mediterranean 
are limited,26 but a large number of speeches survive from the Imperial period, mostly given 
in a civic context (e.g. the speeches of Dio of Prusa).  More relevant to this volume are 
rhetorical treatises and speeches from the Roman Late Republic and Principate.  The 
Ciceronian corpus is vast,27 and contains many speeches utilising emotional techniques.28  Of 
interest too are his rhetorical works, in particular (for our purposes) the De oratore, which 
contains a large section discussing emotional techniques (2.178-216), partly a recapitulation 
                                                 
16 Agreeing with Konstan (2006) 156-68 that these are the emotions discussed, rather than kindness (charis) and 
unkindness as favoured by most previous scholars, e.g. Grimaldi (1988) 128;  Cope (1877) II.89 agrees with 
gratitude. 
17 He describes a number of unnamed emotions too. 
18 On these groups, see Sanders (2014) 59-64. 
19 Judicial, deliberative and display being the three subdivisions he discusses at Rh. 1.3 – other types such as 
hortatory, supplicatory etc. presumably being hybrids. 
20 This treatise, the Rhetoric to Alexander, is contained within the Aristotelian corpus.  Its attribution to 
Anaximenes of Lampsacus is long-standing and probably correct. 
21 See further Sanders (this volume). 
22 Griffith-Williams (this volume) considers two arbitrations in inheritance disputes. 
23 For emotive persuasion in literary letters, see Westwood (this volume). 
24 For a brief introduction to emotion in Classical Greek rhetoric and oratory, see Konstan (2010). 
25 On explicit versus covert emotion arousal, see further Sanders (2012) 160-1 and (2014) 88-98. 
26 Though on this period see particularly Kremmydas and Tempest (2013).  
27 There are only two non-Ciceronian complete speeches pre-200 CE: a panegyric by Pliny praising Trajan, and 
a (self-)defence speech by Apuleius on a charge of seduction by magic – see Powell (2011). 
28 Cicero’s use of emotional techniques has tended to be taken for granted in scholarly studies. The use of 
emotion has been highlighted especially in the closing sections of his defence speeches, where an appeal to pity 
(commiseratio) is a standard ingredient; cf. Winterbottom (2004).  Gildenhard (2010) 36 notes Cicero’s at first 
sight surprising tendency to present himself as in the grip of strong emotion. On emotion in Ciceronian oratory, 
see also Webb (1997); Powell (2007); Craig (2010). 
 of Greek rhetorical ideas, but particularly adding deeper discussions of voice, gesture and 
dress.29  A second important Roman rhetorician is Quintilian, who also discusses emotional 
techniques at length (Institutio 6.1.7-2.36). 
A third type of evidence of great importance to this volume is literary representations 
of speeches.  These primarily occur in historiography.30  Ever since Herodotus, it was a 
recognised part of ancient historiography to include speeches – especially deliberative and 
hortatory speeches (those used to effect political-strategic decisions, and to encourage armies 
before battle) – that contributed to the unfolding of the events portrayed.  They are more or 
less prominent in different historiographers, but they appear to be universally used, and are 
frequently reported in direct speech (oratio recta) – though sometimes in indirect (oratio 
obliqua).31  Historiographers were not merely recording facts, but creating works of 
literature, and accordingly they had a choice both of which speeches (out of the vast number 
actually given) to include,32 and how accurately or not they wished to portray those 
speeches.33  Literary representations of persuasion are not confined to historiography: 
speeches appear in a wide variety of other genres,34 and other forms of verbal interlocution 
can also be persuasive.35 
One other type of persuasive literature should be discussed, and that is the technical or 
didactic treatise, which seeks to persuade the reader.  Treatises survive from at least as early 
as the Classical period (fifth to fourth centuries BCE), and become increasingly common in 
the latter part of that period and into the Hellenistic (third to first centuries BCE) and 
Roman.36  They cover a very wide range of topics, from medical through military to 
mathematical or economic.  The Hippocratic and Galenic corpora are examples of the first.  
Xenophon was also a prolific author, whose surviving works include several treatises.37  
Treatise writers might attempt to arouse a reader’s emotions, as part of their persuasive 
technique.  Other genres too can arouse a reader’s emotions, most particularly poetry.38 
Finally, we should be aware of the very many types of persuasion that are not literary.  
These include personal letters (preserved on papyri), or petitions (on papyri or carved in 
stone).  They also include prayers or curses addressed to gods (also on papyri or inscribed), 
left at religious sanctuaries or in graves, or thrown down wells.  They also include civic 
inscriptions, intended to persuade a variety of readers.  While some of these types of source 
material might be written by men (or women) with some degree of learning, many more were 
                                                 
29 For a brief introduction to emotion in Roman rhetoric and oratory, see Hall (2007). 
30 See in particular Sanders, Fragoulaki, Winter, Knight and Hagen (this volume). 
31 The inclusion of speeches in oratio recta and obliqua as a narratological technique significantly predates the 
historiographic genre, going back at least as far as Homer – see Fox and Livingstone (2010) 544-6. 
32 e.g. Finley (1972) 26-7, in turn quoting Dion. Hal. Thuc.: ‘Why this particular Funeral Oration, he asked?  
The occasion was neither glorious nor significant.  The answer, he suggested, is that Thucydides wanted a 
Funeral Oration by Pericles at any price.  Or why, he asked, are we given the long debate on the reconsideration 
of the decision to put all Mytilenian males to death, when we properly ought to have had the original debate?’ 
33 Thucydides is famously ambiguous about the accuracy of the speeches he records, saying: ‘I have found it 
difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various 
informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible 
to the general sense of the words [ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης] that were actually used, to make the speakers 
say what, in my opinion, was called [τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ’ εἰπεῖν] for by each situation’; tr. Warner (1972) 47. 
34 For example, see Johncock (this volume) on speeches in Ovid’s epic poem Metamorphoses. 
35 Iurescia (this volume) discusses quarrels in Roman comedy, manufactured by one character for the purposes 
of persuading another. 
36 On technical treatises in the Hellenistic period, see Gutzwiller (2007) 154-67. 
37 See e.g. Winter (this volume). 
38 See Johncock and Hammond (this volume) for examples. 
 written by those with little learning, and were not crafted using literary techniques of 
persuasion – albeit that they might have generic conventions of their own.39 
 
The scope and content of this volume 
 
This volume addresses the variety of ways in which emotions form part of strategies of 
persuasion, both within societies and between groups and individuals in the ancient world.  It 
considers different strata of society (civic equals, armies and their commanders, emperors and 
their subjects, gods and humans), and diverse media of communication.  Persuasion may be 
effected by narrative, exhortation (explicit or covert), or physical actions.  Emotional 
strategies can be aimed at superiors, inferiors or one’s equals; to strangers or friends; and 
deployed for personal gain or the public good.  As we have seen, they can appear in oral 
communications (judicial, deliberative, display, hortatory, supplicatory etc.) designed to be 
heard once, their representations in literature, or in written communications that can be read 
again and again (e.g. treatises, other literary works, letters, inscriptions). 
No single volume could cover the usage of emotion in persuasive strategies in the 
entirety of ancient written literary and non-literary media, and this book does not attempt to 
take such a ‘handbook’ approach.  Rather (and reflecting its origin as a selection of the best 
papers from a recent conference),40 the volume presents exciting new thinking in areas of this 
subject that are currently commanding research (and growing public) interest. 
In recent years scholarship on emotive persuasion techniques has focused primarily on 
two areas: rhetorical techniques as propounded by technical treatises (Aristotle, Anaximenes, 
Cicero, Quintilian);41 and explicit exhortation to feel a small group of emotions (anger, 
hatred, envy, gratitude, pity, goodwill) in Attic forensic oratory.42  This volume is 
consciously designed to move beyond these two areas of scholarship, to examine the use of 
emotion in rhetorical practice in a wide variety of literary genres, non-literary (inscriptional 
and papyrological) texts, and even physical movement.43  And it does so, in some cases, by 
employing a range of theoretical methods (such as conversational analysis, speech act theory, 
and pragmatics)44 that have proved effective in other areas of classical scholarship, or in 
emotion studies in other disciplines (e.g. linguistics, sociology, psychology). 
Part I recognises that our first significant evidence for the Greek understanding of, 
theorizing about and use of emotion as a rhetorical technique comes from the specific 
historical society of Classical Athens.  This is both because of the unusually wide 
participation in oratorical practice thanks to the radical democracy, and due to the 
establishment of philosophical schools in that city during that particular period.  Accordingly 
                                                 
39 See Chaniotis, Dickey and Salvo (this volume). 
40 Held by the Centre for Oratory and Rhetoric (COR) at Royal Holloway, University of London, on 27-28 June 
2013. 
41 e.g. Aristotle: Fortenbaugh (1975) and (1979); Grimaldi (1980) re Rh. 1.1-2 and (1988) re Rh. 2.1-11; Conley 
(1982); Leighton (1996); Nussbaum (1996); Viano (2003); Ben-Ze’ev (2003); Konstan (2003) and (2006); 
Sanders (2014) 58-78; Dow (2015). Aristotle and Anaximenes: Konstan (2010). Aristotle to Cicero: Wisse 
(1989). Cicero: Fjelstad (2003); Powell (2007); Craig (2010). Cicero and Quintilian: Schrÿvers (1982); Webb 
(1997); Hall (2007). Quintilian: Cockcroft (1998); Katula (2003a) and (2003b).  
42 e.g. Johnstone (1999) 109-25 on pity; Allen (2000) and (2003) on anger; Rubinstein (2000) 212-31 on 
gratitude; Fisher (2003) and Cairns (2003) on envy; Kurihara (2003) on hatred; Rubinstein (2004) on anger and 
hatred; Bers (2009) 77-98 on pity; Sanders (2012) on anger, hatred and envy; Rubinstein (2014) on anger and 
pity; Sanders (forthcoming) on goodwill.  On the Roman side, see Webb (1997) on indignation and pity; Craig 
(2010) on indignation.  Also re invective, which implicitly has emotional aspects, see e.g. Steel (2006) 50-2; 
Powell (2007); Seager (2007). 
43 See Jackson (this volume) on the last of these. 
44 On which see respectively Hammond, Iurescia and Dickey (this volume).  Eckert (this volume) uses 
sociological theories of ‘trauma’. 
 the first section of the book is devoted to that one society.  However, it looks at types of 
speeches never before examined in connection with emotions, and draws connections to other 
contemporary genres.  Carey’s chapter explores arguments, in both forensic and deliberative 
oratory and with supporting evidence in historiography and Old Comedy, that play to 
hostility towards a politically dominant individual or faction as part of the competition for 
power.  Griffith-Williams considers the choice of using, or not using, emotional arguments 
alongside rational ones in speeches in inheritance cases, a specific class of forensic speech so 
far largely ignored in studies of emotion.  Sanders turns to deliberative speeches, arguing 
that a completely different set of emotions (fear, confidence, hope, shame and pride) is 
pertinent to this branch of oratory than those used in forensic speeches, evidenced by both the 
Attic corpus and representations of speeches in Thucydidean historiography.  Westwood 
considers Demosthenes’ Letters, written in his exile to the Athenian Assembly and Council, 
showing that in their emotional strategies – narrative of nostalgia to arouse pity and goodwill, 
and arousal of nostalgia in the reader/listener – they function very like actual speeches. 
While Part I necessarily concentrates on (Classical) Greece, the attention of the 
remainder of the book is divided almost equally – though not symmetrically – between 
Greece (of all periods) and Rome.  The following three Parts focus on three different 
directions in which study has spiralled out from Attic oratory.  While it will become apparent 
that there is a range of interconnections between chapters in different sections, the 
organisation that has been chosen highlights three particularly notable thematic groupings. 
Part II examines a variety of ways in which emotion is used in the formation of 
community identity.  Chaniotis considers how the authors of epigraphic texts from poleis 
across the Greek eastern Mediterranean sought to create a feeling of community through 
emotional arousal – a form of purportedly communal emotional performance.  Fragoulaki 
returns to Thucydides, and considers two dramatic rhetorical occasions, in which emotional 
persuasion techniques are (or are consciously not) used internally between speaker and 
audience, and externally between Thucydides and his readers.  Eckert’s is the first chapter to 
take us to Rome, with an interdisciplinary approach to the emotional response to cultural 
trauma (arising from Sulla’s proscriptions), and its rhetorical use in Ciceronian forensic 
oratory and a range of later genres that borrow from and extend Cicero’s techniques.  Finally, 
Jackson’s chapter examines Plato’s description of how emotions could be incited, moulded 
and instilled in a community through participation in choral dance techniques, leading to their 
socialization and mass persuasion to behaviour appropriate to the polis. 
Part III considers emotive persuasion strategies in situations of unequal power.  
Winter compares Xenophon’s Hipparchicus (Cavalry Commander), a technical treatise 
containing instruction in the manipulation of the emotions of one’s men, political superiors 
and the enemy, but no examples, with practical examples in the same author’s 
historiographical Anabasis.  Knight examines narratives of ira Caesaris in poetry, 
philosophy and historiography, showing how Roman emperors could judiciously use displays 
of anger to persuade their subjects to submit to imperial control, and how this technique could 
be abused.  Hagen’s chapter provides a counterfoil, moving from Cicero’s theoretical advice 
on the rhetorical use of tears – as a somatic indicator of a variety of emotions – to practical 
examples in Roman historiography of emperors using tears as an emotive tool to persuade 
and control their subjects.  Johncock takes us from the human to the divine, examining 
speeches in Ovid’s Metamorphoses in which frequently a human tries, but fails, to persuade a 
god; however, Ovid succeeds in persuading his reader of the speaker’s case, and inspiring 
him or her to pity. 
Part IV has two foci, contributing to a greater or lesser extent to each chapter: 
linguistic formulae used to generate emotion, and genre-specific emotive persuasion.  Dickey 
uses pragmatic theories of politeness to examine a shift from making requests via bald 
 imperatives (Classical period) to the emergence of a language of politeness (Hellenistic 
period, both literary and papyrological texts), which reflects changes in language suggesting 
heightened emotion.  Salvo examines how curses and magic spells (inscriptions and papyri) 
addressed to gods aimed to arouse the god’s emotions to persuade him/her to make a mortal 
fall in love with the writer; the god’s methods of doing this effectively comprise a secondary 
persuasion strategy that also might include emotion arousal – though different emotions to 
those aroused in the god.  Iurescia takes a multi-disciplinary theoretical approach to quarrels 
in Roman comedy, exploring linguistic techniques through which negative emotions (anger 
and fear) can be aroused to throw a collocutor’s judgment off-balance and manipulate them.  
Finally, Hammond uses discursive psychology to examine Catullus’ emotional discourse – 
his choice of language and invention of linguistic terms – which both expresses the emotions 
of characters in his poems, and arouses the reader’s emotions to persuade them of the 
verisimilitude of the depicted conversations. 
As well as the connections between chapters in the same Part, a wide range of further 
thematic links will become apparent (and the reader’s attention will be directed to these by 
the frequent cross-references between chapters).  It is worthwhile here drawing attention to 
some of these thematic interconnections.  While most of the chapters deal with arousing 
emotions in order to persuade, some (Chaniotis, Fragoulaki, Knight, Hagen, Dickey) 
instead/also deal with displaying or performing emotions – truly felt or otherwise – to 
persuade. Griffiths-Williams and Fragoulaki both compare in depth two attempts at 
persuasion, one of which is made using emotional arguments, the other (at least at the surface 
level) avoiding them.  Several chapters (Chaniotis, Hagen, Salvo, Johncock) focus on or refer 
to persuasion of gods.  And several (Fraoulaki, Salvo, Johncock) involve persuasion of the 
reader. 
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